2005-03

Joint task force requirements determination: a review of the organization and structure of joint task forces

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March 2005

Naval Postgraduate School

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report reviews military operations that employed a Joint Task Force (JTF) organizational model to organize subordinate forces. It provides background information; analyzes major characteristics to include mission, time line, participants and structures; and summarizes major lessons learned. A total of 845 source documents were identified for this review. Sources include individual Joint Universal Lessons Learned Reports, After-Action-Reports, Joint-After-Action-Reports, informational papers, memoranda, letters, briefing presentations and information gathered through telephone and e-mail correspondence with selected personnel.

Analysis indicates that a majority of operations commenced after January 1999 (86%), with a significant number of operations initiated after September 11, 2001 (58%). A plurality of operations involved combat/counter-terror missions (39%); followed by peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and stability and security operations (21%); and non-combatant evacuation operations (7%). Training and counter-drug operations, national security special events and other types of operations made up the remaining 32%. A flag or general officer most often commanded these operations, with most of these being led by an Army general officer.

Analysis indicates that operations were lead by all combatant commands, but nearly 25% occurred in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. The number of response days has continued to increase, with current operations accounting for 38% of response days accumulated in the previous decade (i.e., 1990-1999). Examination of warning time characteristics for selected cases showed that a majority of operations had a planning period of 4-5 weeks.

Content analysis of unique source documents identified a total of 922 problems/issues. Nearly a quarter of these problems/issues dealt with command, control, communication, computers and intelligence issues (C4I); 6% of the problems/issues dealt with deployment, engineering and logistics; 31% of the problems/issues dealt with personnel, training, financial management, legal, medical, and public affairs; and 39% of the problems/issues dealt with operations, plans and policy. These findings suggests that while progress has been made with respect to how we organize, train and equip to conduct a joint fight, there is still considerable room for improvement.

Command and control of the JTF is a work in progress. JTF C4I capabilities remain a challenge. Logistical support, including equipment, is lacking. Manpower and Training shortfalls impair the functioning of the JTF. These findings lead us to propose that a JTF Functional Support Element (JTF-FSE) be developed to address challenges associated with these functional areas.

A JTF Planning Smart Book should be developed to provide guidance and instruction on the JTF planning process to ensure the participation of key personnel. Attention is needed on the deployment planning and personnel rotation process. Additionally, it is recommended that JTF guidance and policy be developed in several areas including

disclosure of sensitive information; IA/Coalition access to intelligence and communications systems and data; INFOSEC and OPSEC for IA and Coalition partners. Finally, it is noted that JTF operations have unique funding requirements that demand flexibility. Operations routinely include LNOs from all Services, Interagency and Coalition personnel. A Joint Funding Process needs to be developed to enable the JTF to provide funding for Joint/IA/Coalition support.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. PURPOSE

This report provides a review of recent military operations, which employed a Joint Task Force (JTF) organizational model. The review was performed at the request of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in order to identify the major characteristics of recent JTF operations and summarize major lessons learned. The goal of the review was to document the rationale, establishment and operation of recent JTFs; conduct a literature review of JTFs from military and academic sources to provide lessons learned for future JTF development and operation; and develop a research protocol to be used in identifying and evaluating the decision processes, procedures and mechanisms through which JTF are formed. The main body of the report presents the results of the review of operations to include the major characteristics of JTF operations and major lessons learned emerging from these operations. Appendix A includes a review of the academic literature on teams, networks, cooperation and trust that examines the implications of this research for JTF operations. Appendix B includes a JTF protocol designed to further examine problems and concerns identified in the review. A separate classified report contains individual information on each of the JTF operations reviewed.

1.2. BACKGROUND

The end of the "Cold War" brought great hopes for a new era of peace and stability for the world. It promised to provide an unprecedented "New World Order" that would be characterized by harmonious relationships between the superpowers of the world. It also brought hopes for spreading peace and prosperity to less fortunate nations in the Third World. Coupled with these hopes, were expectations that the need for military intervention throughout the world would slowly diminish. However, none of these hopes and dreams has been realized. In fact, the Post-Cold War period ushered a significant increase in regional conflicts throughout the worlds less fortunate nations.[1] U.S. forces deployed to new missions in such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and more recently to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

[1] Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & Gorenburg, D. (2003, August). *For the record: All U.S. forces' responses to situations, 1970-2000* (with addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008414.A2/Final). Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis. Grimmett, R.F. (2002, February). *Instances of use of United States Armed Forces abroad 1798-2001* (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL 30172). Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.

The U.S. Armed Forces have performed well in accomplishing their missions in domestic and international fronts. However, there continue to be mounting concerns regarding the most effective way to organize, train and equip military forces for the next century.[2] Although reforms introduced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 have made a significant impact in the Service's ability to engage in "joint" operations, evidence suggests that more changes are needed to optimize the effectiveness of the force.[3]

[2] Bruner, E. (2004, May). *Military forces: What is the appropriate size for the U.S.?* Congressional Research Service (RS21754). Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service. Gaffney, H.H. (2003, April). *The American way of war in the emerging strategic environment: Remarks presented at the Army War College's annual strategy conference* (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008205.A1/Final). Alexandria, VA. Center for Strategic Studies. Gaffney, H.H., Cobble, W.E., Gorenburg, D., & McDevitt, M. (2004, February). *The American way of war and its transformation in the Post-Cold-War period, 1989-2003* (Center for Naval Analysis Report CRM D0008607.A1/Final). Alexandria, VA. Center for Strategic Studies. Government Accounting Office. (1996). *Military readiness: Data and trends for January 1990 to March 1995* (GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR). Washington, DC. Author. Ryan, M.C. (1998). *Military readiness, operations tempo (OPTEMPO), and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. forces doing too much?* (Congressional Research Service Report 98-41). Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.

[3] Hammond, P.Y. (1990). Fulfilling the promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in operational planning and command. In J.A. Blackwell Jr., & B.M. Blechman (Eds.), *Making defense reform work* (pp. 121-150). Mc Lean, VA. Brassey Incorporated. Murdock, C.A., Flournoy, M.A., Williams, C.A., Campbell, K.M., Coss, M.A., Marks, A.N., & Weitz, R.W. (2004, March). *Beyond Godldwater-Nichols (BG-N): Defense reform for a new strategic era (Phase I Report).* Washington, DC. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2005, March). *Beyond Godldwater-Nichols (BG-N): Defense reform for a new strategic era (Phase 2 Report)*. Washington, DC. Author. Quinn, D.J. (1999). *The Goldwater-Nichols DoD reorganization act: A ten year retrospective*. Washington, DC. National Defense University.

There is a need to re-examine the organization and structure of joint forces to address emerging roles that the military is likely to play in the foreseeable future. Research suggests that significant concerns remain on the question of how to prepare, organize and equip Joint Task Forces (JTFs).[4] Studies have shown that there are recurrent problems associated with the "ad hoc" nature of JTF Headquarters—namely problems with successful organization and execution of command and control (i.e., JTF HQ).[5]

[4] Bartch, E.D. (1997). *Standing joint task force headquarters: A step in the right direction?* Unpublished manuscript, US Marine Corps Command and General Staff College at Quantico, VA. Betros, L.A. (1991). *Coping with uncertainty: The joint task force and multi-service military operations.* Unpublished paper, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Boy, W.W. (1992). *Joint task force bravo: A model for forward presence.* Unpublished manuscript, US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. CHIPS (2003, Summer). *Talking with brigadier general Marc E. Rogers.* CHIPS, 15-18. Davis, P.K. (1982, March). *Observations on the rapid deployment joint task force: Origins, directions and mission.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Cincinnati, OH. Goodman, M.T., & Scott, R.M. (1998, September). *Standing joint task force: Opportunity lost.* Marine Corps Gazette, 82(9), 38-39. Grant, N.P. (1993). *Joint task force staffs: Seeking a mark on the wall.* Unpublished paper, US Naval War College at Newport, R.I. Gritton, E.C., Davis, P.K., Steeb, R., & Matsumura, J. (2000). *Ground forces for a rapidly employable joint task force: First-week capabilities for short-warning conflicts.* Santa Monica, CA. RAND. Herman, R., & Welch, L. (1997). *Defense science board task force on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) integration final report.* Washington, DC. Defense Science Board Task Force. Hildenbrand, M.R. (1992). *Standing joint task forces: A way to enhance America's warfighting capabilities?* Unpublished paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Hoffman, J.T. (1997). *Organizing command echelons for joint warfare.* Unpublished paper, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA. King, R.H. (1995). *NATO's combined joint task force: Separable but not separate*. Unpublished paper, U.S. Naval War College at Newport, R.I. McMillin, P.M. (1992). *The standing joint task force afloat.* Unpublished paper, U.S. Navy Command and General Staff College. Saunders, W.A. (1992). *Joint pub 5-00.2 joint task force planning guidance and procedures: A critical review.* Unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Walsh, E.M. (1992). *Does a MAGTAF commander have sufficient capability within the MAGTAF command element to command a JTF?* Unpublished manuscript, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA. Zimmerman, D.K. (2004, July-August). *Understanding the standing joint force headquarters.* Military Review, 28-32.

[5] Coleman, J.C. (1991). *Tumbling "component walls" in contingency operations: A trumpet's blare for standing joint task force headquarters.* Unpublished paper, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA. Colodney, L.L. (1995). *Operational command and control for joint and component commands: Integration or duplication.* Unpublished manuscript, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA. Henchen, M.L. (1993). *Establishment of a permanent joint task force headquarters: An analysis of soucing and command and control structure capable of executing forced entry contingency operations.* Unpublished Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KA. Napper, J. (2002). *Information management in the JTF*. Unpublished paper, US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Ross, B.A. (1993). *The joint task force headquarters in contingency operations.* Unpublished paper, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA. Stewart, G., Fabbri, S.M., & Siegel, A.B. (1994). *JTF operations since 1983* (Center for Naval Analysis Report CRM 94-42/July 1994). Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analysis.

Table 1.1. *Summary Review of Past JTF Operations.*

Author/Year	Operation (JTF)	Major Problem Areas
Coleman (1991)	Mayaguez Urgent Fury	Command & Control Intelligence Communications Personnel & Training Plans & Policy (Joint Planning)
Colodny (1995)	Urgent Fury	Command & Control Intelligence & Communications
Henchen (1993)	Cuban Missile Crisis Power Pack Urgent Fury Just Cause	Command & Control Communications Personnel & Training
Hoffman (1997)	Uphold Democracy Restore Hope Desert Shield/Storm	Command & Control Communications Personnel & Training (Jointness)
Napper (2002)	Joint Endeavor Joint Forge	C2l Communications Personnel & Training
Ross (1993)	Urgent Fury El Dorado Canyon Just Cause Desert Shield Hurricane Andrew	C2 Intelligence Personnel Logistics Operation & Plans
Steward et al., (1994)	Urgent Fury JTF Lebanon Earnest Will JTF Yellowstone Alaskan Oil Spill Philippine Coup Just Cause Sharp Edge Proven Force Provide Comfort Sea Angel Fiery Vigil Quick Lift JTF GTMO Provide Relief Los Angeles Provide Transition JTF Andrew JTF Marianas JTF Hawaii Restore Hope Provide Promise Provide Refuge	Command & Control Interagency Coordination Coalition Partner Coordination Logistic Support/Coordination Plans & Policy for IA/Coalition Operational Planning (COP) Communications Personnel (Augmentation)

Table 1.1 presents a summary of studies reviewing major military operations conducted within the past three decades. As can be seen from Table 1.1, there is a consistent pattern of failures in resolving issues related to four broad areas including (I) Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; (II) Logistics; (III) Personnel and Training; and (IV) Plans and Policy. These problems are pervasive and impact all types of operations including combat (e.g., Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm), civil support (e.g., Hurricane Andrew, JTF Los Angeles, JTF Yellowstone) and peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (e.g., Provide Comfort, Restore Hope) to name but a few. Furthermore, these failures have been felt across time despite policy changes that have taken place during the same time period (e.g., Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). The consistency of these findings across this time period suggests that there is a need to continually monitor our progress and check the status of our efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the JTF process.

1.3. TASKS AND OBJECTIVES

This report reviews military operations conducted from 1990 to 2004 that employed a Joint Task Force (JTF) organizational model to organize subordinate forces.[6] It focuses on major JTF operations and excludes data from subordinate JTFs formed as part of larger JTF organizations. The review analyzes data from the "Joint Universal Lessons Learned" (JULLS) database and includes individual JULLS reports, "After-Action Reviews" (AARs) and "Joint After-Action Reviews" (JAARs) for major military operations conducted during this time period. The review provides background information on each of the JTF operations; analyzes major characteristics of each JTF operation including its mission, time line, participants and structures; and summarizes major lessons learned for these JTF operations. Detailed reports for each JTF operation are included in a separate classified report.[7] Summary findings are presented and discussed in this report.

1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report is organized into four Chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the report, highlighting major tasks and objectives. Chapter 2 provides a description of the methodology including data, procedures and analytical strategy. Chapter 3 presents the major findings from the review of operations. It discusses the implications of these findings for future JTF operations. Chapter 4 presents the major conclusions and recommendations of the study.

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[6] Combatant commanders can generally adopt six organizational models for subordinate forces: (1) subordinate unified command, (2) joint task force. (3) functional component command, (4) Service component command, (5) single Service force command, or (6) combatant commander control of specific forces (Joint Publication 3-0).

[7] Estrada, A.X., & Laurence, J.H. (2005, February). *Joint task force operations (JTF) 1990-2004.* Monterey, CA. Naval Postgraduate School. (Secret).

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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

2.1. IDENTIFICATION OF JTF OPERATIONS

A current listing of Joint Task Force operations was compiled from multiple sources including the Joint Staff—Personnel (JS-J1), Operations (JS-J3), Strategic Plans & Policy (JS-J5), Operational Plans & Interoperability (JS-J7); and each of the Combatant Commands (COCOM)—US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); US Pacific Command (USPACOM); US Central Command (USCENTCOM); US European Command (USEUCOM). Data obtained from the Joint Staff and COCOMs were cross-referenced by searching COCOM and JTF related websites. Table 2.1 presents JTF operations identified for this review.

Table 2.1. *Joint Task Force Operations 1990-2004*

Operation	Organization	Dates
Skilled Anvil	JTF-SA	Jul99-Jun00
Atlas Response	JTF-AR	6-30Mar00
Honduras	JTF B	Aug83-Dec04*
	JTF 6	Nov89-Dec04*
Northern Watch	CTF-ONW	Jan97-May03
Southern Watch	JTF-SWA	Aug92-May03
Allied Force	JTF-NA	Jan-Jul99
Joint Guardian	TF-Falcon	Jun99-Dec04*
Allied Harbor	JTF-SH	Apr-Jun 99
Summit Guard/NCS	JTF CS	Oct99-Dec04*
Enduring Freedom-Philippines	JTF 510	Jan02-Dec04*
	JTF Piton	Jan-Feb01
Winter Olympics	JTF O	Jan01-May02
	JTF 509	Dec01-NA
Enduring Freedom	JTF 160	Jan-Nov02
Enduring Freedom	JTF170	Feb-Nov02
Enduring Freedom	JTF GTMO	Nov02-Dec04*
Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan	CJTF 180/76	May02-Dec-04*
Autumn Return	JTF-AR	Sep02-Oct02
	JTF 519	Oct02-Dec04*
	JTF-4	Jan-Apr03
Enduring Freedom-HOA	CJTF HOA	Dec02-Dec04*
Sheltering Sky	JTF-L	Jul-Oct03
	JTF 58	16-24-Oct03
Secure Tomorrow	JTF-H	Mar-Jun02
Iraqi Freedom	CJTF 7	Jun03-May04
Iraqi Freedom	CJTF7/MNC-I	May04-Dec04*
Iraqi Freedom	CJTF7/MNF-I	May04-Dec04*

Note: (*) indicates continuing operation as of December 2004.

2.2. DATA AND PROCEDURES

A total of 845 source documents were identified for this review. Source documents included individual Joint Universal Lessons Learned Reports (JULLS), After-Action-Reports (AARs), Joint-After-Action-Reports (JAARs), informational papers, memoranda, letters, briefing presentations and information gathered through telephone and e-mail correspondence with COCOM and JTF personnel.

Table 2.2 presents summary characteristics of the JTF documents by source type. As can be seen in Table 2.2, source documents included JULL Reports (87%), AAR/JAAR (4%), and other types of documents (13%).[8] We contacted personnel from the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) to cross-reference and validate our search strategy, and to locate additional sources of information. JCLL personnel validated our strategy and indicated that all available information (e.g., JULLs, AARs/JAARs) would be accessible via COCOM or JCLL websites.[9] No additional data were identified nor retrieved.

Table 2.2 *Source Documents by Category for JTF Operations 1999-2004.*

		Type of Document		
JTF	**Total**	**JULLS**	**AAR/JAAR**	**OTHER**
JTF-SA	30	26*	2	2
JTF-AR	64	60*	3	1
JTF B	8			8
JTF 6	3			3
CTF-ONW	6	1		5
JTF-SWA	62	59		3
JTF-NA/TF Falcon	9		2	7
JTF-SH	3			3
JTF CS	47	40		7
JTF 510	19			19
JTF Piton	0			
JTF O	47	45*	2	
JTF 509	0			
JTF 160/JTF170/JTF GTMO	242	235	3	4
CJTF 180/76	17		13	4
JTF-Autumn Return	2			2
JTF 519	0			
JTF-4	0			
CJTF HOA	7			7
JTF-L	129	126	3	
JTF 58	112	110	1	1
JTF-H	33		1	32
CJTF7/MNC-I/MNF-I	5			5
TOTAL	845	702	30	113

Note: (*) indicates JULLS were derived from AAR/JAAR.

[8] Other sources documents included memoranda, briefings, informational papers and information gathered through direct correspondence with COCOM/JTF personnel

[9] Personal communication with M. Barker, Research Analyst with the Joint Center for Lessons Learned.

Data for this study were obtained from multiple sources. Individual requests for data were submitted to the Joint Staff (JS-J1, JS-J3, JS-History Office), COCOM Historians and Lessons Learned Specialists, and individual JTF Public Affairs Officers. Each request asked for general information about the JTF including mission, dates, commander, organizational structure, administrative processes (JMD; manning type; fill rates), planning process (conplan, exercises, staff assistance) and C4 systems (hardware, software, netware). The requests also asked for documents and reports describing major issues and problem areas associated with each operation. In addition, computerized searches of the Joint Universal Lesson Learned (JULL) databases for each COCOM (i.e., NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM) were performed to cross reference sources and identify additional source documents for each JTF.

2.3. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

All source documents were assessed for both quality and content. Documents containing (a) irrelevant information; or (b) duplicate/redundant information were identified and removed from further analysis.[10] Content analytical techniques were used to analyze all source documents. Content analysis is an analytical technique applied to qualitative data.[11] It allows researchers to reduce textual data into content categories based on an explicit set of coding of procedures. A conceptual analytical approach was employed for the present study. Conceptual analysis focuses on identifying and quantifying major concepts within a text. Initially, members of the research team reviewed a subset of documents. This review identified major categories across operations and suggested an emergent coding strategy.[12] Four conceptual categories were identified through this process. Category I included documents dealing with Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence issues. Category II included documents dealing with Deployment, Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions. Category III included documents dealing with Personnel, Training, Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs issues. Category IV included documents dealing with Operations and Plans & Policy. Categories were used to code data and tabulate frequency of items within each category.

[10] 14 documents containing irrelevant or duplicate information were not subjected to analysis.

[11] Carley, K. (1990). Content analysis. In R.E. Asher (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of language and linguistics*. Edinburgh. Pergamon Press. Government Accounting Office. (1996). *Content analysis: A methodology for structuring and analyzing written material* (GAO/PEMD-10.3.1). Washington, DC. Author. Krippendorf, K. (1980). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. Beverly Hills, CA. Sage Publications. Roberts, C.W. (Ed.) (1997). *Text analysis for the social sciences: Methods for drawing statistical inferences from texts and transcripts*. Manwah, NJ. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Weber, R.P. (1990). *Basic content analysis* (2nd Edition). Beverly Hills, CA. Sage Publications.

[12] Emergent coding is a process by which salient themes and categories are derived through initial review of documents. The themes/categories are used to code data and compute frequency estimates across source documents.

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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. OVERVIEW

Data analysis proceeded in two steps. Initially, all source documents were coded for descriptive analysis. Each document was coded for several features including (a) operation; (b) duration; (c) geographic location; (d) service; (e) CJTF rank; (f) mission type; and (e) warning time. Next, content analytical methods were employed to derive estimates of the type and frequency of problem/issues encountered across operations. The results are presented in the sections below. Characteristics of JTF operations are presented in the first section. Warning time of JTF operations are presented in the second section. Major lessons learned are presented in the last section.

3.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF JTF OPERATIONS

Characteristics of JTF operations were compiled to provide an overview of the nature and scope of operations conducted during this time period. Figure 3.1 presents a time line for each operation included in this review. As noted in Figure 3.1, the majority of JTF operations were initiated after 1 January of 1999. Four exceptions to this trend include JTF Bravo, JTF 6, CTF ONW and JTF SWA, which commenced prior to this date. JTF Bravo and JTF 6 are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTFHQ) that do not have supporting forces assigned to the JTF; CTF ONW and JTF SWA were follow-on missions from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Figure 3.1 reveals that a significant number of operations were conducted after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In fact, 53% of the operations were started after that date. Although not all JTFs are necessarily associated with the on-going Global War on Terror (GWOT), the shift in the number of operations within this short time frame, suggests that the so-called "peace dividend" of the 1990s gave way to a period of increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

Indeed, the nature of the threats we face, and the enemies we must confront, have changed dramatically, leading to a transformation of the security environment in which operations must now unfold.[13] These changes are reflected in the types of operations US forces have engaged in during this period. Figure 3.2 shows that the plurality of operations involved combat/counter-terror missions (39%), followed by peacekeeping (PKO), humanitarian assistance (HAST) and stability and security operations (SASO) (21%); and non combatant evacuation operations (NEO) (7%). Training and counter-drug operations, national security special events and other types of operations made up the remaining 32%.

[13] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004). National military strategy of the United States of America 2004: A strategy for today—a vision for tomorrow. Washington, DC. Author.



Figure 3.1 Time Lines of JTF Operations 1990-2004



Figure 3.2 JTF Operations by Mission Type

These findings are consistent with the results of a recent study of military operations conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).[14] CNA found that the majority of operational missions involved contingency positioning or show of force (51%).[15] CNA also found a growing increase in the percentage of combat operations (14%) and comparable figures for both PKOs (24%) and NEOs (7%). Thus, there appears to be a continuing increase in combat missions and a relatively stable number of PKOs and NEOs.

Table 3.1 presents other characteristics for each JTF operation included in this review. Examination of the data in Table 3.1 leads to four overarching generalities. First, JTFs have operated in all geographic combatant commands. Second, JTFs have been led by all military departments including Reserve and National Guard components. Third, JTFs have been commanded most often by a general/flag officer.[16] Fourth, JTF response days have continued to increase across decades.

[14] Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & Gorenburg, D. (2003, August). *For the record: All U.S. forces' responses to situations, 1970-2000* (with addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008414.A2/Final). Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis.
[15] Operations reviewed did not necessarily employ a JTF organizational model.
[16] JTF Bravo is the only JTF commanded by an 06.

Table 3.1. *Major Characteristics of JTF Operations 1990-2004*

JTF	Dates	COCOM	Service	Rank	Mission	Duration
JTF-SA	Jul99-Jun00	EUCOM	USA	O10	Plan SASO for FRY	330
JTF-AR	6-30Mar00	EUCOM	USAF	O8	HAST	25
JTF Bravo	Aug83-Dec04*	SOUTHCOM	USA	O6	Training/HAST/Counterdrug	7665
JTF 6	Nov89-Dec04*	NORTHCOM	USA	O7	Training/Counterdrug	5505
CTF-ONW	Jan97-May03	EUCOM	USAF	O7	Combat: No Fly Zone	1211
JTF-SWA	Aug92-May03	CENTCOM	USAF	O8	Combat: No Fly Zone	3920
JTF-NA	Jan-Jul99	EUCOM	USN	O10	Support NATO PKO FRY	170
TF-Falcon	Jun99-Dec04*	EUCOM	USA	O7	PKO Kosovo	2005
JTF-SH	Apr-Jun 99	EUCOM	USA	O10	HAST to FRY	82
JTF CS	Oct99-Dec04*	NORTHCOM	USARNG	O8	NSSE: CBRNE	1885*
JTF 510	Jan02-Dec04*	PACOM	SOCPAC	O7	Combat/Counterrorism	699*
JTF Piton	Jan-Feb01	SOUTHCOM	NA	NA	NA	60
JTF Olympic	Jan01-May02	JFCOM	USARNG	O7	NSSE: Winter Olympic	515
JTF 509	Dec01-NA	PACOM	NA	NA	NA	1460
JTF 160	Jan-Nov02	SOUTHCOM	USA	O7	Detention	398
JTF170	Feb-Nov02	SOUTHCOM	USA	O8	Interrogation	258
JTF GTMO	Nov02-Dec04*	SOUTHCOM	USA	O7	Detention/Interrogation	787*
CJTF 180/76	May02-Dec-04*	CENTCOM	USA	O8	Combat/Counterrorism	940
JTF-AR	Sep02-Oct02	EUCOM	SOCEUR	O7	NEO	14
JTF 519	Oct02-Dec04*	PACOM	NA	NA	NA	790*
JTF-4	Jan-Apr03	CENTCOM	NA	NA	NA	120
CJTF HOA	Dec02-Dec04*	CENTCOM	USMC	O8	Combat: Counterrorism	753*
JTF-L	Jul-Oct03	EUCOM	USA	O8	NEO	74
JTF 58	16-24-Oct03	PACOM	USN	O10	NSSE: Security for POTUS	8
JTF-H	Mar-Jun02	SOUTHCOM	USMC	O7	SASO	107
CJTF 7	Jun03-May04	CENTCOM	USA	O9	Combat/SASO	335
MNC-I	May04-Dec04*	CENTCOM	USA	O9	Combat/SASO	210
MNF-I	May04-Dec04*	CENTCOM	USA	O10	Combat/SASO	210

Note: (*) indicates continuing operation as of December 2004. NA: Not Available. SASO: Security and Stability Operation. FRY: Former Republic of Yugoslavia. HAST: Humanitarian Assistance Operation. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. PKO: Peacekeeping Operation. CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Event. NSSE: National Security Special Event. NEO: Non Combatant Evacuation Operation.

Further examination of each of these characteristics reveals some interesting patterns. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of JTF operations by COCOM. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, 11% of the operations were conducted by NORTHCOM, 21% of the operations were conducted by SOUTHCOM, 14% of the operations were conducted by PACOM, 29% of the operations have been conducted by EUCOM, and 25% of the operations were conducted by CENTCOM. Although the distribution of JTF operations indicates that all COCOMs have shared the burden of responsibility in leading operations, it is important to recognize that 25% of these operations occurred within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). This is particularly important to consider because the lack of permanent bases and tenuous agreements with countries in the region makes it extremely challenging to address logistical requirements for operations within this AOR.



Figure 3.3 JTF Operations by COCOM

Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of JTF operations by Service. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, 54% of the operations were commanded by the Army, 11% of the operations were commanded by the Air Force, 7% of the operations were commanded by the Navy, 7% of the operations were commanded by the Marine Corps, and 21% of the operations were commanded by other service organizations (e.g., SOCPAC, SOCEUR).



Figure 3.4 JTF Operations by Service



Figure 3.5 JTF Operations by Level of Command

Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of JTF operations by level of command.[17] As shown in Figure 3.5, the majority of the operations were commanded by a General/Flag officer—JTF Bravo is the only operation commanded by an O6 level officer (presently a Colonel). Thirty-seven percent of the operations were commanded by a Brigadier General/Rear Admiral (Lower Half), 24% of the operations were commanded by a Major General/Rear Admiral (Upper Half), 10% of the operations were commanded by a Lieutenant General/Vice Admiral, and 24% of the operations were commanded by a General/Admiral.



Figure 3.6 JTF Operations Command Level by Year

[17] This analysis excludes 4 operations for which data on command level was not available (i.e., JTF Piton; JTF 509; JTF 519; JTF 4).

Further examination of these data across time reveals an increase in the rank requirements for JTF command. As can be seen in Figure 3.6, the number of JTF commanded by O7 and O8 has increased steadily throughout the years; JTFs commanded by 09 and 010 has also grown. Whereas the increase of JTFs commanded at the 07/08 level can be understood in terms of increased OPTEMPO, the increase in JTFs commanded at 09/10 may reflect the increasing VUCA associated with these operations.

Table 3.1 presents the number of response days for each JTF operation included in this study. Response days were defined as the number of days between the start and end of actual operations—i.e., when JTF forces were conducting the mission. It should be noted that these estimates do not take into account the time associated with the planning process (i.e., warning time). As can be seen in Table 3.1, response days ranged from 8 days (for JTF 58) to 7,665 (for JTF Bravo). Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative number of response days for military operations within the past four decades. As can be seen in Figure 3.7 the number of response days has grown continually across decades. The total number of response days for military operations conducted during the 1970s (i.e., 1970-1979) was 10,245 days. The total number of response days for military operations conducted during the 1980s (i.e., 1980-1989) was 17,382 days—which represents approximately a 70% increase over response days in the 1970s. The total number of response days for military operations conducted during the 1990s (i.e., 1990-1999) was 66,930 days—which represents a 285% increase over response days in 1980s. The total number of response days for military operations conducted during the 2000s (i.e., 2000-2004) is 25,622—which represents 38% of the number of response days in 1990s. It is important to recall that the number of response days accumulated for the 2000s represent a period of only 5 years (i.e., 1 JAN 2000—31 DEC 2004).



Figure 3.7 JTF Response Days by Decade[18]

[18] Data for military operations from 1970-1990 was taken from Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & Gorenburg, D. (2003, August). *For the record: All U.S. forces' responses to situations, 1970-2000* (with addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008414.A2/Final). Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis.

In summary, the analysis of major characteristics of JTF operations reveals a number of significant trends. First, we note that the majority of operations commenced after January 1999, with a significant number of operations initiated after September 11 2001. Second, we note that a plurality of the operations reviewed involved combat missions or peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance missions. Third, we note that a substantial proportion of these operations have involved EUCOM, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM but nearly 25% have taken place in the CENTCOM AOR or are associated with operations related to GWOT (e.g., OEF, OIF). Fourth, we note that JTF operations are most often commanded by a flag or general officer, with most of these being led by an Army general officer. Finally, we note continuing growth in the number of response days for JTF operations—with current operations accounting for 38% of response days accumulated in the 1990s.

3.3. WARNING TIME CHARACTERISTICS FOR SELECTED CASES

Warning time characteristics of JTF operations were compiled to examine the JTF planning process. Warning time was defined as the amount of time between the first order relating to an operation (e.g., Warning Order [WARNORD]; Planning Order [PLANORD]; Alert Order [ALERTORD]) and the execution order for that operation (e.g., EXORD).[19] We attempted to collect data on each operation but were only able to obtain complete data for 16 of the operations reviewed. Thus, the results of these analyses are based on the 16 cases for which complete data was available. We acknowledge the limitation of these findings and emphasize that these must be interpreted with caution.

Table 3.2 lists warning time for the 16 cases available for analysis. As can be seen from Table 3.2 warning time ranged from 0 to 476 days. The operations include the full spectrum of missions, i.e., combat, PKO/HAST/SASO, NEO, and NSSEs. The distribution of operations included in this analysis was 50% combat, 25% PKO/HAST/SASO, 12% NEOs and 12% NSSEs. While these data may not be comprehensive, they appear to approximate the population of operations from which they were drawn (See Figure 3.2).

[19] Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability. (1999, January 13). *Joint task force guidance and procedures* (Joint Pub 5-00.2). Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gaffney, H.H. (2002, June). *Warning time for US forces' response to situations: A selected study* (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0006378.A1/Final). Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analysis. Guerra, S. J. (1997, November). *Responses to Harm's-Way and Humanitarian Situation by Naval Forces, 1990-1996* (Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 97-100). Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analysis.

Table 3.2 *Warning Time for Selected JTF Operations*

JTF	Mission	Warning Time*
CTF-ONW	Combat	0
JTF-AR	HAST	0
JTF-H	SASO	6
JTF-SWA	Combat	8
JTF 160	Combat	12
JTF-AR	NEO	15
CJTF HOA	Combat	26
CJTF 180/76	Combat	30
JTF 58	NSSE	30
JTF-L	NEO	35
JTF 170	Combat	35
JTF-NA	PKO	52
JTF GTMO	Combat	75
JTF 510	Combat	120
TF-Falcon	PKO	120
JTF O	NSSE	476

Note. (*) Indicates the number of days between the first order relating to an operation and the execution order for that operation (i.e., WARNORD to EXORD).

To further examine these data, we coded warning time into weekly intervals ranging from 0 (indicating no warning time) to greater than six weeks. Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of warning time by the number of weeks. As can be seen in Figure 3.8, the majority of the operations had a warning time of less than 6 weeks. Twelve percent of the operations had no warning period, 12% of the operations had a warning period of about 1 week, 19% of the operations had a warning period of about 2-3 weeks, 25% of the operations had a warning period of about 4-5 weeks, and 31% of the operations had a warning period longer than 6 weeks. Thus, we find that with few exceptions (e.g., JTF NA, JTF GTMO, JTF 510, TF Falcon, JTF O) the majority of JTF operations have a planning period that is less than 6 weeks in length.



Figure 3.8 Distribution of Warning Times for Selected JTF Operations

3.4. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

Content analytical methods were used to analyze the 845 unique source documents obtained for analysis. Each source document was reviewed and coded into one of the four categories that were identified in the emergent coding process. Category I included documents dealing with Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence issues. Category II included documents dealing with Deployment, Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions. Category III included documents dealing with Personnel, Training, Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs issues. Category IV included documents dealing with Operations and Plans & Policy. Frequency of problems/issues contained within each source document was recorded and tabulated. Additionally, salient themes within each category were also identified. Context units within each theme were recorded to enable description of problems/issues within each category.



Figure 3.9 Distributions of Problems/Issues by Category

A total of 922 problems/issues were contained within the 845 source documents reviewed. Figure 3.9 shows the distribution problems/issues by category type. As can be seen in Figure 3.9, 24% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category I, which dealt with command, control, communication, computers and intelligence issues (C4I); 6% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category II, which dealt with deployment, engineering and logistics; 31% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category III, which dealt with personnel, training, financial management, legal, medical, and public affairs; and 39% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category IV, which dealt with operations, plans and policy.[20]

[20] This section provides an overview of major lessons learned across the JTFs reviewed. For detailed analysis of JTFs see Estrada and Laurence (See Footnote 7).

Table 3.3 *Salient Themes and Sample Issues by Category*

	Salient Themes	Sample Issues
Category I	*Command & Control*	• Unclear roles and responsibilities—OPCON/ADCON/TACON • Lack of support from DJTFAC and LNO • Bifurcation of chain of command—CJTF dual hatting impaired focus on JTF • Lack of guidance on JTF HQ formation led to ad hoc establishment of HQ—SJTFHQ
	C4 Capabilities	• Inadequate specification of JTF C4 needs • Lack of secure voice/data comm. • Shortfalls in Hardware, Software, Netware—GCCS, SINCGARS, SATCOM, SIPRNET, CENTRIX, Crypto, bandwidth, LAN access
	J2 Capabilities	• Equipment/accessibility issues—Network/LAN access, SATCOM for J2 • Lack coordination/integration of J2 product • SOP for J2 data sharing with IA/Coalition • Ad hoc ISR support to functional areas • Lack of secure voice/data capabilities—MACC, JWICS, LAN Support • Interoperability of J2 equipment
Category II	*Logistic Plans & Equipment*	• Unclear delineation of J4-C2 • Lack of planning/coordination of J4 needs • Inadequate specification of equipment and personnel needs to support J4 mission • Lack of ITV of logistic materiel
	Deployment Planning	• Delayed deployment of personnel/equipment • Coordination of country clearance/over-flights • Reserve mobilization process is inefficient • Lack of support for reserve dependents—family support, housing and allowance issues.
	JTF Funding	• Lack of joint funding capability to support JTF costs up front • Lack of joint funding capability to support JTF support to IA/Host Nation/Partner Nation/Coalition Partners

Note. Category I—Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence. Category II— Deployment, Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions. Category III— Personnel, Training, Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Category IV—Operations and Plans & Policy.

Table 3.3 *Continued*

	Salient Themes	Sample Issues
Category III	*Manpower Shortfalls*	• Inadequate specification of personnel requirements on JMD • Significant shortfalls in functional areas—J1, J2, J4, J6, Engineering, PAO, Medical, SJA, Component/IA/Coalition LNOs
	Training Shortfalls	• JMD/JOPE/TPFDD • J2/J6 systems requirements • Funding for Joint/IA/Coalition • OPSEC/INFOSEC for IA/Coalition • Culture/Religion impact on mission • Psychological health of forces
	Rotation Planning	• Uncoordinated rotation process leads to significant personnel shortfalls • Rotation process leads to inadequate turnover process • Rotation process results in loss of institutional memory for JTF SOPs and emergent processes
Category IV	*Planning Process*	• Maintain updated rosters for POCs • Integrate key personnel in planning process • Ineffective and inefficient mission analysis • Integration of IA/LNO/Coalition personnel • Establish IA planning task force for regional planning
	Policy/Guidance	• Guidance on INFOSEC/OPSEC for missions with IA/Coalition personnel • Guidance on Disclosure of Classified Information to IA/HN-PN/Coalition • Guidance on IA/Coalition access to J2/J6 systems and data. • Guidance on ROE Development • SOP for SJTFHQ Requirements • JTTP for CSAR/PR • JTTP for PAO/JIB/IOM • JTTP for Medical Operations • JTTP for J2 Dissemination to IA/Coalition

Note. Category I—Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence. Category II— Deployment, Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions. Category III— Personnel, Training, Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Category IV—Operations and Plans & Policy.

Table 3.3 provides a summary of the main findings across JTF operations reviewed. Table 3.3 also lists salient themes and sample issues for each of the emergent categories identified. As shown in Table 3.3, three themes dealing with *command and control* (C2), *C4 capabilities*, and *J2 capabilities* were identified for Category I; three themes dealing with *logistic plans and equipment*, *deployment planning*, and *funding* were identified for Category II; three themes dealing with *manpower shortfalls*, *training shortfalls* and *rotation planning* were identified for Category III; two themes dealing with *planning processes* and *policy/guidance* were identified for Category IV.

These findings highlight several recurrent challenges that are associated with employment of the JTF organizational model. First, the results suggest that the organization of JTF C2 remains a challenge. Indeed, C2 organizational issues were mentioned across all of the operations reviewed. Although the nature of the challenges may vary across these operations, the simple fact remains that we have yet to develop a successful approach for supporting the JTF build up process. This is particularly important given the fact that supporting personnel are available at some of the COCOMs to address these issues (e.g., DJTFACs are available at SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM). Another related challenge involves C4 and J2 capabilities. C4 and J2 capability shortfalls in hardware, software and netware were pervasive across the operations included in this review. Although alternative solutions are usually developed to meet mission requirements, C4/J2 capabilities that are flexible, deployable and interoperable are needed. These capabilities should be configured to have the necessary hardware, software and netware to support C4/J2 mission requirements and ensure rapid and reliable dissemination of intelligence and communications. These capabilities should also be configured to provide adequate workspace for all personnel.

Second, the results suggest that logistics, deployment and funding of JTF operations are also challenging. This trilogy is particularly important to consider since the vast majority of JTF operations have been conducted (and will likely continue to be conducted) in AORs that lack well established systems and relationships to support deployment of personnel and logistical support for JTF operations. Recall that 25% of the JTF operations reviewed were taking place in CENTCOM AOR, which lacks bases and firm agreements with neighboring nations. Failure to address logistics and deployment issues may result in substantial increases in operational costs and time delays in the delivery of equipment and supplies. Neither of these outcomes is desirable or sustainable in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous security environment in which forces must operate. Another related issue involves JTF funding. There is need to develop funding procedures that provide JTF costs up front. Furthermore, funding procedures need to be flexible enough to support Joint/Service costs, and interagency/coalition costs.

Third, the results suggest that there are continuing challenges associated with manning and training of JTFs. Personnel shortfalls were pervasive in the operations reviewed. One plausible explanation for this finding may involve the Joint Manning Document (JMD) planning process. Personnel shortfalls may be caused by the inadequate specification of personnel requirements on the JMD. It is important to ensure that the JMD reflect JTF personnel requirements including specification of training requirements.

Failure to properly specify personnel requirements may be associated with the increased need for training observed in this review. Training shortfalls were noted for J2/J6 systems, funding and JMD/JOPES/TPFDD. Lack of properly trained personnel within any of these areas is likely to have an impact on JTF operations. It is important to ensure that personnel and training requirements are properly identified on the JMD to ensure that JTFs are adequately manned with qualified personnel (i.e., properly trained in functional areas). Training on the impact of culture and religion on military operations, psychological health of forces and funding Joint/IA/Coalition partners was also needed. Training incorporating aspects of culture/religion on JTF operations is critical given the increased number of operations being carried out in Muslim nations. Additionally, greater understanding of the cultural and religious factors that can potentially impact operations is essential in today's security environment. Relatedly, greater understanding of the psychological variables that may influence personnel performance are also important to consider. Finally, the rotation planning process appears to present a significant challenge in the operations reviewed. Rotation planning is particularly important because it can have a negative impact on JTF operations. Rotation planning should ensure that it provides adequate lead-time to conduct turnover between incoming and outgoing personnel and ensure preservation of institutional processes that emerge as a function of time and experience.

Fourth, the results also highlight challenges associated with the planning process and the growing need for policy and guidance on various aspects of JTF operations. Integration of key personnel at all phases of the crisis action planning (CAP) process is critical for the proper conduct of mission analysis. Up-to-date rosters for point of contact can facilitate this process. Relatedly, CAP process can benefit from the integration of IA/LNO/Coalition personnel. With regard to policy and guidance, the results highlight the need for policy and guidance on information security (INFOSEC) and operational security (OPSEC) when dealing with IA and Coalition personnel. There is also a need for guidance and policy on disclosure of sensitive information to IA/Coalition personnel. Guidance is also needed to address accessibility to J2/J6 systems and data by IA/Coalition personnel. Lastly, the need for Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for several areas was noted including combat search and rescue (CSAR)/personnel recovery (PR); Public Affairs (PAO)/Joint Information Bureau (JIB)/Information Operations (IO); Medical Operations; and Intelligence Dissemination to IA/Coalition.

3.5. SUMMARY

Review of unique source documents of major JTF operations conducted between 1990-2004 reveals several interesting findings. The majority of operations were initiated near the start of the new decade, with the large percentage of these commencing after September 11, 2001. Combat and peacekeeping/humanitarian make up the largest portion of these operations (60%). Operations have been conducted in all AORs and have been led by all COCOMs. However, 25% of these have been conducted in the CENTCOM AOR. The majority of operations have been lead by a general/flag officer,

most likely from the Army. Review of dates and warning times for selected cases suggests that operations are lasting longer but the majority of these are planned in less than 5 weeks (69%). Examination of lessons learned suggests that there are recurrent challenges associated with JTF operations. Challenges impact four broad areas of JTF operations including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; Manpower, Training and Rotation; Plans and Policies.

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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. OVERVIEW

Since the passage of the Goldwater—Nichols Act of 1986, the Department of Defense has continually strived to increase its capacity to engage in joint operations. Indeed, a number of significant changes have been implemented to improve the way in which we organize, train and equip forces for joint operations. However, examination of problems/issues of concern reveal a pattern of continuing challenges across several areas including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; Manpower, Training and Rotation Planning; and Plans and Policy. These findings are consistent with those reported in previous studies of JTF operations (See Table 1.1). The consistencies of these findings are quite remarkable considering the fact that the situational characteristics of these operations vary significantly in terms of missions, scope, geographic location and degree of jointness. These findings suggests that although progress has been made with respect to how we organize, train and equip to conduct a joint fight, there is still considerable room for improvement. These results have a number of important implications for how we organize, train and equip in future JTF operations.

4.2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.2.1. Command, control, communications and intelligence

Conclusion 1. Command and control of the JTF is a work in progress. Delineation of command and control was problematic across many of the operations reviewed. C2 structures need to clearly specify roles and responsibilities for all personnel within the JTF HQ and between supporting forces. For example, bifurcation of the chain of command (i.e., dual-hatting of the CJTF) dilutes attention and focus on the JTF process. This is particularly important during the initial planning process when the attention of the CJTF is critical and time is significantly compressed. Although there may be situations in which dual hatting may provide some benefits (e.g. operations involving the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces within CONUS, i.e., NORTHCOM AOR), it should be avoided as a general rule. CJTF should rely on subordinate personnel to fulfill alternative roles whenever possible. Lack of support from the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells (DJTFAC) also hampered JTF C2. Support from DJTFAC should be available to ensure that C2 architecture is properly designed. Whenever necessary the DJTFAC should fill the position until properly trained personnel are integrated into the JTF via the augmentation process. Finally, it is important to ensure that adequate facilities and workspaces are available to support C2 mission requirements. To ensure that C2 structures are properly identified, including the specification of roles and responsibilities and facility and space requirements, ***we recommend that a standing C2 support element be developed to facilitate the stand up of JTF C2***. The C2 support

element should be familiar with C2 requirements and be able to fill JTF C2 positions until properly trained personnel are augmented.

Conclusion 2. JTF C4ISR capabilities remain a challenge. C4ISR capabilities shortfalls were pervasive in the JTF operations reviewed. C4ISR shortfalls involved hardware, software and netware (e.g., GCCS, SINCGARS, SATCOM, SIPRNET, CENTRIX) for both JTF-J2 (Intelligence) and JTF-J6 (Communications). Accessibility issues also impacted C4ISR. Access to C4ISR assets was not always available to JTF or to supporting forces (e.g., IA personnel, Coalition personnel). In addition, lack of guidance (e.g., SOPs) for standardizing J2 intelligence products further complicated C4ISR challenges for the JTF. Adding to the scope of these problems was the fact that interoperability of equipment was not always achieved and ISR support was ad hoc. It is important to ensure that JTF C4ISR capabilities meet mission requirements. Accordingly, it is ***recommend that a C4ISR support element be created to provide technical advice to the JTF J6/JTF J2 during the initial stages of the JTF planning process.*** The support element should facilitate the identification and specification of C4ISR needs and augment JTF J2/J6 until properly trained personnel are augmented.

4.2.2. Logistics, deployment and funding

Conclusion 3. Logistical support, including equipment, is lacking. Command and control of the JTF J4 is hampered by shortfalls in both personnel and equipment. Equipment shortfalls are particularly problematic as they often lead to second and third order effects. Limited C4 capabilities impair ITV of supplies and equipment, which in turn may lead to sub-optimal logistic arrangements (e.g., increased reliance on commercial [vs. military] logistical support systems), which in turn may result in increasing operational costs and increased delays in delivery of equipment and supplies. Logistical support is critical for the successful execution of JTF operations. We need to ensure that JTF J4 has the proper personnel and equipment to fulfill mission requirements. Shortfalls in personnel and equipment may be caused by inadequate specification of J4 requirements and inadequate planning. Accordingly, ***it is recommended that a JTF J4 support element be created to provide technical advice to the JTF J4 during the initial stages of the JTF planning process***. A Joint Logistics and Transportation Planning Task Force could be set up to survey logistic requirements and catalogue equipment and personnel requirements for doctrinal purposes. In addition, ***it is recommended that JTF J4 be integrated early into the planning process*** to ensure that J4 planning results in timely and economic delivery of equipment and supplies to the JTF.

Conclusion 4. Deployment planning process needs to improve. Deployment of JTF forces will always be a challenge. The nature, scope and pace of JTF operations (i.e., short warning time and nearly instantaneous employment into VUCA environments) guarantees that the process will remain dynamic and ever changing. However, the

underlying planning process required to deploy forces should be stable across operations. The results of this review suggest that there is a need to improve the deployment planning process. Although joint doctrine does provide some general guidance on particular aspects of the deployment process[21] there is a need to address challenges associated with the deployment and employment of Reserve Component (RC) personnel. Knowledge and familiarity with the joint deployment process is critical for JTF operations. Accordingly, ***it is recommended that both guidance and a supporting deployment element be created to improve deployment planning of JTF forces***. In particular, specific guidance on the establishment of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (JRSOI) centers should incorporate issues pertaining to the deployment of RC personnel.

Conclusion 5. JTF operations have unique funding requirements that demand flexibility. There is an increasing need for flexibility in the funding process for JTF operations. Operations are increasingly involving greater number of participants from diverse organizations. Operations now routinely include LNOs from all Services, Interagency and Coalition personnel. This change in participation demands greater flexibility in the JTF's ability to provide funding support to these participants. There is a need to establish a funding capability that is able to support JTF costs up front and covers costs associated with support for Joint, IA and Coalition personnel. Accordingly, ***it is recommended that a Joint Funding Process be developed to enable JTF to provide funding for Joint/IA/Coalition support.***

4.2.3. Personnel, training and rotation planning

Conclusion 6. Manpower and Training shortfalls impair the functioning of the JTF. The review of operations suggests that manning and training pose a significant challenge to JTF operations. Personnel shortfalls were reported in all JTF operations included in this review. This may be caused by the inadequate specification of manpower and training requirements on JTF JMDs. Indeed, problems associated with personnel shortfalls are often compounded by the augmentation of personnel who lack proper training for key functions within the JTF. It is important to ensure that JTFs are manned with qualified personnel (i.e., formally trained in specific functional area). Accordingly, ***it is recommended that a support element be created for the JTF J1.*** This element should comprise individuals knowledgeable with the JTF manning process to include knowledge of JMD and JOPES processing. Individuals must also be knowledgeable of manning requirements for all functional and specialty areas within the JTF (e.g., J-directorates and special staff—PAO, SJA, CMOC, Medical, Engineering) to include requirements for LNOs (e.g., interagency and coalition). In addition, training shortfalls observed suggest the need to institute specific training in particular areas affecting JTF operations. ***It is recommended that training packages be developed for Joint-Interagency-Coalition intelligence and communications requirements and limitations.***

[21] Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability. (1999, January 13). *Joint task force guidance and procedures* (Joint Pub 5-00.2). Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Furthermore, ***it is recommended that a survey of intelligence and communications architectures and systems be conducted to catalogue Service, Interagency and Coalition capabilitities, identify strengths and weaknesses, and identify interoperability challenges and solutions.*** Training doctrine is also needed to address the impact of cultural and religious factors on mission planning and execution. JTF operations are almost always conducted in foreign environments with vastly different cultural and religious systems. Cultural and religious factors should contribute to the planning process and influence the execution the mission. Accordingly, ***it is recommended that training doctrine on cultural and religious influence on JTF operations be developed***. Doctrine should provide information on political, economic social, technological and informational aspects of the culture. Doctrine should also include information on major religious influences within the culture including historical information on the status of organized religious groups.

Conclusion 8. Personnel rotation planning needs to improve. The review of operations suggests that the rotation planning process is often asynchronous with the manpower requirements of the JTF. In many cases, the rotation planning process resulted in positions being unfilled for key functional areas within the JTF. Lack of a coordinated rotation plan limited transition and turnover processing between out-going and in-coming personnel. This process also resulted in significant losses of institutional memory for informal processes and procedures developed as a function of time and experience. It is important to ensure that the rotation of personnel provides adequate time for turnover and transition of outgoing and incoming personnel. The rotation process needs to provide sufficient time to ensure that institutional memory for SOPs are exchanged between personnel. The rotation process also needs to be synchronized with the manpower needs of the JTF. The rotation process needs to ensure timely and efficient filling of personnel throughout the JTF.

Conclusion 9. JTF planning process lacks participation of key personnel. The review of JTF operations suggests that the JTF planning process does not always include relevant personnel. Inclusion of personnel from key functional areas, LNOs, IA, and Coalition partners did not always occur. Moreover, lack of updated rosters for key personnel often make it impossible to request assistance from key personnel whenever a particular issue arises. It is important to ensure that JTF planning integrate participation from all functional areas to include LNOs and coalition personnel. JTF rosters should be developed for key functional areas and should be periodically reviewed and updated to ensure accuracy of the information. ***It is recommended that a JTF Planning Smart Book be developed to provide guidance and instruction on the JTF planning process.*** The smart book should include information on key directorates, roles and responsibilities, and identify commonly asked questions and answers related to the planning process. The smart book should also contain issues for consideration when dealing with IA and Coalition personnel.

Conclusion 10. JTF guidance and policy is needed in key functions. The reviews of operations suggest the need for guidance and policy in several areas pertaining to the successful execution of JTF operations. Guidance is needed for disclosure of sensitive information to IA and Coalition partners; IA/Coalition access to intelligence and communications systems and data; INFOSEC and OPSEC for IA and Coalition partners. There is also a need for formal doctrine covering specialty areas within the JTF. ***JTTP should be developed for several areas including CSAR/PR; JIB/IO; and Medical Operations. Additionally, JTTPs should incorporate IA and coalition roles.***

4.2.4. Summary

Review of major military operations conducted between 1990-2004 indicates that there are continuing challenges with the planning and execution of JTF operations. Challenges impact four broad areas including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; Manpower, Training and Rotation; Plans and Policies. Section 4.1 presented a series of recommendations designed to address challenges associated with each of these functional areas—namely personnel (e.g., C2), intelligence (e.g., C4ISR), logistics and communications. Figure 4.1 links conclusions and recommendations by JTF functional areas. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, our analysis leads us to propose that a JTF Functional Support Element (JTF-FSE) be develop to address challenges identified in this review. Figure 4.1 depicts the organizational configuration of this element. It is important to note that this model is not comprehensive. Our intent is to provide a descriptive model of the critical support areas emerging from our review. We acknowledge that this model may not capture all of the relevant problems/issues confronting JTF operations. However, it does provide a beginning step for addressing challenges identified.

4.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The findings presented in this report are limited by the particulars of the data we were able to obtain. We were not able to obtain primary source materials for each operation (e.g., JULLS/JAAR). In some case we had to rely on secondary sources (e.g., memoranda of record and summary reports). In cases where no documented information was available, we relied on individual interviews with personnel involved/knowledgeable with these operations. To the extent possible we collected data from at least two sources (e.g., documents, interviews). These limitations notwithstanding, it is important to place our findings into the larger body of work reported in previous studies of military operations. Viewed from this perspective we find that the results of the present study are remarkably consistent with those reported in the literature. The consistency of findings across studies provides some assurance against some of these concerns.

Though the results of this study add to our understanding of the challenges associated with the planning and execution of JTF operations, there are several issues that could not

be addressed with these data. We recommend that a survey of JTF commanders be conducted to assess their perceptions regarding the importance of each of the problem areas identified in this review (e.g., command and control; logistics) and examine the nature of the problems including workarounds and solutions. We recommend that a comprehensive study of warning time be performed on military operations to include JTF operations from 1990 to the present. This study would allow validation of the analysis presented in the present study. Though we do not expect to find significant differences across studies, we would expect that the estimates for planning time to be more accurate. We recommend that a survey of current JTF communications and intelligence sections be conducted to catalogue hardware, software and netware systems and configurations for use in future JTF operations. The results of this study could be used to develop a "JTF SMART BOOK" on communications and intelligence. We recommend that a comprehensive effort to catalogue and maintain a historical database of JTF operations be conducted. The results of these efforts could enable further examination of JTF operations by independent researchers and academics interested in studying military operations. Finally, we recommend that a biannual review of JTF operations be conducted to periodically examine progress and identify continual challenges related to the planning and execution of JTF operations.



Figure 4.1. JTF Functional Support Element Model

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Report
AC	Active Component
ALERTORD	Alert Order
AOR	Area of Responsibility
C2	Command and Control
C4	Command, Control Communication and Computers
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COCOM	Combatant Commands
CONUS	Continental United States
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CTF	Combined Task Force
DJTFAC	Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
EXORD	Execution Order
GCCS	Global Command Control Systems
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance
IA	Interagency
INFOSEC	Information Security
IO	Information Operations
ITV	In Transit Visibility
J1	Joint Personnel
J2	Joint Intelligence
J3	Joint Operations
J4	Joint Logistics
J5	Joint Strategic Plans and Policy
J6	Joint Communications
JAAR	Joint After Action Reports
JCLL	Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JS	Joint Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF HQ	Joint Task Force Headquarter
JTTP	Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures
JULL	Joint Universal Lessons Learned
LNO	Liaison Officer
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

NG	National Guard
NSSE	National Security Special Event
OPSEC	Operational Security
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
RC	Reserve Component
SASO	Security and Stability Operation
SATCOM	Satellite Communication
SINCGARS	Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Network
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SJTFHQ	Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOCPAC	Special Operations Command Pacific
SOP	Standard Operation Procedures
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
VUCA	Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity
WARNORD	Warning Order

APPENDIX A
TEAMS, NETWORKS, COOPERATION, AND TRUST

Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D.

Cohesion is a central concept in military training and operations. Group training and experiences are meant to engender team solidarity, which has been shown to promote military effectiveness. In addition to the importance of teams to military readiness, the edict to "train as we fight" has implications for the organization and maintenance of Joint Task Forces (JTF). To meet today's missions and in response to directives, the Services must operate "jointly." Although there are few if any research studies that directly address JTF structure and management, the literatures regarding teams, organizational cooperation, and networking are relevant. A synopsis of selected studies in these areas is provided.

TEAMS

A team is an interdependent group, organized toward a common goal, with specific roles. A "team" approach is appropriate when there is a need for expertise in various areas and the concurrent performance of two or more tasks is required. Teams operate in the context of a larger task and its members have relevant specialized knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Team structure is division of responsibilities or work requirements into subtasks. Task conditions typically include high workload and time pressure. Research involving aviation crews, naval surface warfare teams, and tank crews has found that effective team performance is not an automatic result of training *individuals* (Salas, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995). Teams must synchronize "taskwork," the specific behaviors/duties performed by the individual. They must also engage in teamwork or coordination of these duties and appropriate attitudes that promote effective team performance. Team behaviors include mutual performance monitoring, backup behavior, intrateam feedback, and a belief that success depends upon their interaction. Team leadership is also critical and modeling appropriate behavior by the leader is key to effectiveness. With regard to communication and coordination, when workload is low, explicit coordination is typical whereas implicit coordination is typical under high workload conditions. Shared mental models are assumed to exist among established teams.

The command-and-control team (Klimoski & Jones, 1995) is characterized by a highly coordinated, prescribed response to events. Functions of each job are highly specialized and interdependent, thus requiring extensive training. If one person cannot accomplish his/her duties then the entire team suffers. The team approach can involve a tradeoff between speed and accuracy—with teams potentially retarding the former but enhancing the latter.

Teams must be considered within the environmental context in which they operate (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995). Characteristics of the

situation and the organization affect task and work characteristics. These then determine the requisite team competencies for effective performance. When there is a lack of knowledge and/or uncertainty about role responsibilities of other members, ineffective or degraded performance results. Knowledge and skills are not enough, the teams must have team relevant knowledge and skills; the members must be able to operate and employ their skills and knowledge within the team context. Team goals, objectives, mission, norms, resources, and the relationship to larger organization must be communicated and coordinated to improve team effectiveness. A generic, heuristic model of team effectiveness is provided below.

Model of Team Effectiveness



Source: Adapted from Hackman, 1987 in Klimoski & Jones, 1995.

Critical dimensions of teamwork include: communication, adaptability, coordination and cooperation, performance monitoring and feedback (giving and acceptance of suggestions or criticism), interpersonal relations, leadership/team management, shared situational awareness, and decision making. The transfer of information and resources is crucial to success. Communication is vital and performance decreases as the intelligibility of communication degrades (Achille, Schulze, & Schmidt-Nielsen, 1995). Team structure and communication structure are related but not synonymous (Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 1997). Team structure refers to the roles, information, and capabilities assigned to team members; whereas communication structure sets the parameters regarding who speaks to whom. When the task structure is highly complex, highly interdependent, and decentralized, communication networks must be well developed. Group cohesion and communication and coordination training increase the performance of teams involved in complex, interdependent, and hierarchical tasks. Task difficulty moderates the communication processes.

Aviation teams have received much research attention and in this arena, results show that faulty communication leads to accidents. Communication frequency has been found to be correlated positively with performance in nonhierarchical teams but correlated negatively in hierarchical teams. Communication mediates the effects of workload and structure. Poor teams tend to overload information or communication

channels with a barrage of questions. Communication and shared mental models are facilitated not only through familiarity but standardization (Leedom & Simon, 1995).

A number of team dimensions have been examined in relation to performance including workload, time pressure, structure, individual proficiency, and overlapping skills (Salas, et al. 1995). Enumerating the combinations of results is beyond the scope of this synopsis but the point is that teams are not simply generic groups. For teams to be effective, especially in a crisis, experience and skills in working together are critical (Tjosvold, 1995). Further, a team must be well structured and managed if they are to be efficient and effective. Faulty teamwork can lead to tragedy (Cannon-Bowers, et al. 1995). Accidents and performance deficiencies occur *not* because team members cannot perform their tasks but because they fail to coordinate their activities and efforts effectively. The need for expertise in various areas, stress and high workload characterize many military tasks. High workload tends to degrade individual performance. The requirement for coordination in teams increases the individual workload, thus it is necessary to train and manage the coordination processes (Leedom & Simon, 1995; Urban, Bowers, Monday, & Morgan, 1995). Strong teams are characterized by formalization, coordination, cooperation, goal priority, interdependence, and trust (Salas, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995).

Team characteristics such as cohesiveness are important to coordination and success. In fact, cohesiveness facilitates team decision making under time pressure (Zaccaro, Gualtieri, & Minionis, 1995). Also, inter-positional uncertainty, or lack of a clear understanding of appropriate operational behaviors for each team member, results in lower quality coordination and poorer cohesion. Communication, coordination, cohesion, and team processes in general are enhanced by interaction. In short, intra-team familiarity leads to better coordination and, hence, performance. For example, airline crews have been found to be better at coordinating decisions and actions if they have flown together recently (Leedom & Simon, 1995). Individuals and the team evolve over time. The length of time that a team is together has an impact on performance. (Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 1997).

Attitudes are a very important but often ignored aspect of teams. Attitudes about self and team affect performance. Attitudes toward teamwork, collective orientation, cohesion, mutual trust, and shared vision are related to performance (Canon-Bowers, et al, 1995). Faulty attitudes toward teamwork are a problem. Teams possess competencies that transcend individual performance and provide a collective influence. In addition to the functional structure, there is a need for a well-developed team concept or a collective orientation. To reap the benefits of teamwork, there must be potency—the belief that the team will succeed. Internal norms that are in synchrony and increased collective efficacy improve performance. In short, it helps to have confidence in the team. Potency is a result of actual ongoing interactions with environments. Shared perceptions of team efficacy influences team performance. Team level knowledge affects coordination strategies. Effective coordination and delegation occur when members view other members as competent. The development of trust is vital. Before discussing trust further, relevant work in the areas of networks and cooperation is highlighted.

NETWORKS

Networks represent another type of organizational structure designed to tackle complex, multidimensional tasks. Such cooperative organizational alliances enhance competitiveness and effectiveness (Milward & Provan, 1998) by linking fragmented and uncoordinated service systems. The objective of networking is to provide services efficiently and effectively (avoiding duplication of effort) while maintaining organizational autonomy (Provan & Milward, 2001). The degree of network interaction varies on a continuum from intermittent coordination to more long lasting network structures (Mandell, 2003). As with teams, the structure of the integration affects performance and the degree of social learning that occurs as a result of the interactions and their results.

Key to networking is cooperation and commitment of members. Network management can contribute to program performance; Managers can influence results (Meier & O'Toole, 2003). Interdependence requires dealing regularly with other organizations or agencies. Managers must link operations, tap resources, and encourage collaborative partnerships. Directing managerial time and effort toward networking can improve implementation performance and success. It is necessary to devote time to dealing with such a complicated interdependent environment. Formal management of networks can pay dividends in the future.

Network effectiveness often depends on the relative maturity and development of the network. Effectiveness requires trust and commitment, which are built on a history of interactions. At first, ties will be weak and loose as agencies test commitment and reliability. If the network is seen as temporary then resource sharing is limited in scope. The network must become a viable inter-organizational entity if it is to survive. It must have legitimacy and external support. To be effective, the services must act as a network – incurring organizing and transaction costs. Formal public sector networks are led, coordinated, and governed by a central, local administrative entity or a network administrative organization (NAO) (Provan & Milward, 2001). Cooperative efforts are more complex than coordinated efforts; thus the former requires a more formal leadership/management system.

Cooperation is the lynchpin of effective networking and cooperation is expected to produce outcomes that are more favorable to networked parties than when in competition. In contrast to the private sector with its profit motive, cooperation should be suited to the public sector. Theoretically, the public sector should be less affected by the potential downsides of networking including reduced autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence (Provan & Milward, 2001). Networks can be perceived as a threat to survival and thus resource sharing, political turf battles, regulatory differences, and the like can encumber their success. Successful networks require consideration of the relative power of members—not all are equal partners. Participants have to be willing to give up power and negotiate power struggles and conflicts. It is necessary to dealing with

scarce resources as well as political and cultural realities and move beyond the government's proclivity to operate via traditional, hierarchical relationships.

Given the complexity and potential benefits from properly structured and maintained networks, evaluation and monitoring should be part of the management process. Process and outcome evaluation can address whether the network is a more efficient and effective service delivery mechanism. To be sure, gauging success is complicated. And, before one measures the outcomes, it is important to measure the linkages or the actual degree of network connections (Provan & Milward, 2001). That is, it is necessary to determine whether and to what degree formal network processes are operating before assessing network outcomes. The content and quality of the interactions, decision-making skills, and complexity need to be measured. In addition to assessing the strength of relationships between and among network members, it would be wise to evaluate its administrative structure or NAO, described above as the hallmark of a viable network. Evaluating outcomes requires recognition of networks' multiple stakeholders. For example, for social service networks that are trying to improve access, utilization, responsiveness, and integration while maintaining or reducing costs, evaluation must consider the community, network, and organization levels.

Networks provide a range of services—some critical and some peripheral. Evaluation can help the network to identify nonessential services and avoid duplication of effort. Effectiveness tends to be seen by external groups as depending on what specific service providers either do or don't do. Agencies tend not to be rewarded for contribution to the network. The lack of a constituency group for a network can be deleterious and thwart cooperative efforts because members may still be tying to ensure the survival of their own agency. Acting in self-interest can preclude the using selected available resources more effectively.

COOPERATION AND TRUST

Effective teams or networks require not just involvement but cooperation to enhance success (Hillebrand & Biemans, 2003). Firms with well-developed internal and external interfaces perform better with the formal a prerequisite for the latter. Cooperation serves to minimize distinctions among group members, which can impede teamwork, information sharing, and coordination (Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003). An often-overlooked moderator of team or network effectives is the reward structure. There is an inherent tension between competitive and cooperative reward structures. Thus, it may be necessary to change the organization to realize cooperation and achieve effective teams. Collaborative rewards promote trust, cohesiveness, and mutually supportive behavior. In competitive structures there is a tendency to keep information proprietary. Further, success is viewed as a zero-sum game thus factors are at work not only to win but also to impair the progress of others. Information and service industries (including Defense) tend to require coordination because tasks that one member faces are affected by the performance of others. Recalling the speed-accuracy tradeoff mentioned above, it may be necessary to implement hybrid cooperative and competitive reward structures reward structures.

Cooperative structures promote diffusion of knowledge throughout the team. There is exchange of information and discussion of ideas. For cooperation to work, the participants must be able to discuss opposing views openly. One must be a responsive and responsible team member and eschew good advice and insist on doing it "your" way. Studies of flight crew members show that when the team members believe that they had cooperative rather than competitive or independent goals, they were much more likely to coordinate their efforts effectively. Under cooperative reward structures and goals, members are much more prepared to discuss ideas openly and directly (Tjosvold, 1995). Although "real world" organizations seldom structure pure cooperative or competitive tasks, a depiction of such pure structures or dominant patterns is presented below:



- More division of labor
- Role specialization
- More economic use of personnel
- More task productivity
- Integrates self-interest to achieve mutual goals

- Want others to act inefficiently; when others productive they are less likely successful
- Prove they are most capable
- Own ideas superior
- Frustrated when others develop useful ideas and work hard

Source: Tjosvold, 1995.

In addition to competition and cooperation there is independence; group members' goals are unrelated and attainment, efficiency, and effectiveness by one party neither helps nor hinders the other. "Interaction" is characterized by disinterest and indifference.

Cooperation induces higher achievement and productivity, especially on more complex tasks. Cooperation promotes information sharing, adoption of another's perspective, effective communication and influence, exchange of resources, assistance and support. *Constructive controversy* is the nature of the interaction. It is under competitive and individualistic conditions that people are more likely to avoid conflict. Under competitive goals, managing conflict is difficult and infighting is common. There tends to be a restriction of information and resource exchange; communication is distorted; and conflict is either escalated or avoided. A depiction of constructive controversy within cooperative structures is provided below:



Source: Tjosvold, 1995.

Organizational linkages, strategic alliances, partnerships, and joint ventures characterize modern organizations. Such cooperative arrangements are more responsive to rapid change; and they increase effectiveness of communication and problem solving. To manage teams and/or networks, interpersonal dynamics are important and ***trust*** is crucial. Trust is a state involving confident positive expectations about another's motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk. High levels of trust reduce transaction costs and uncertainty about the future (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Trust is important for cooperation, coordination, and performance. Once built, it is expected; and broken trust has greater negative motivational consequences than confirmation of trust. Trust involves not just predictability but confidence in the face of risk. Trust is invoked when there is an ambiguous course of action in the future, the outcome depends on the behavior of others, and the strength of the harmful event is greater than the beneficial event.

Three elements contribute to level of trust:1) chronic disposition toward trust; 2) situational parameters; and 3) history of the relationship. Trust is a dynamic phenomenon involving reciprocal self-disclosure and conflict resolution. The processes of evaluation and information exchange are at work. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe three types of trust is business contexts:

1. **Deterrence/calculus-based trust** – behavioral consistency. Do what you say you will do.
2. **Knowledge-based** trust – behavioral predictability; other's likely choice of behaviors.
3. **Identification-based trust** – empathy with other party's desires and intentions. One can act as an agent for the other.

Calculus based trust involves an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. Calculus rather than deterrence conveys the importance of the rewards of maintaining the cooperation. Calculus based trust is partial and fragile and is driven by the desire to maintain a professional reputation.

As its label implies, knowledge-based trust relies on information. The parties have a history of interaction and thus develop a generalized expectancy about each other. The better one knows the other the more accurate the prediction. Predictability enhances trust and accuracy requires repeated interactions in multidimensional relationships. Regular communication is important.

Identification-based trust seems the "best model" for the Joint Service and Interagency situation. Such trust relies on salient group identification. That is, the parties identify with the goals of the linked organizations. Such identification enhances the frequency of cooperation. Activities that strengthen identification-based trust include: collective identity, co-location, creating joint products or goals, and committing to same objectives. A synchronous chemistry characterizes the relationships.

Regardless of the type of trust, it must be developed and maintained to best cooperative advantage. Trust evolves and changes and it can decline. The team or network perspective suggests that inter-organizational cooperation is more than a contractual and legal arrangement. Cooperation requires management attention to include formulation of rules, prevention of instability and disorder, and promotion or defense of mutual interests. Firms are not independent, acting on their own in the market. They have to interact with other firms and organizations such as government, associations, regulatory commissions and the like. Lasting and stable relations promote common knowledge and knowledge sharing (in lieu of reinventing the proverbial wheel) is important to organizational success.

Suggestions for Joint Task Force Management

The literature regarding teams and networks offers valuable suggestions for the organization of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Given the complex tasks assigned to JTFs, teams or networks are a logical organizational strategy. And, just as the tasks or missions are complex, developing and maintaining the team are also complex. Teams can solve complex, difficult problems effectively. Groups must be well structured and managed if they are to solve problems effectively and efficiently.

Effective teams require appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitudes among its constituents. They not only call for appropriate staffing and material resources, but organizational support, mission clarity, communication, commitment, and leadership. Teams must be effectively managed and see themselves as teams. Experience and skills in working together are critical. Being familiar with one another can aid members in their

performance. Service over joint familiarity may also present a potential pitfall. If the JTF commander is expected to take on the leading role for his Service as well, this can be problematic and dilute leadership effectiveness for the JTF. An unwarranted over reliance on one Service may work against the more efficient and effective Joint, capabilities-based approach. Standing JTF Headquarters (perhaps aligned by COCOM but coordinated across COCOMs) could alleviate the role overload of the JTF commander and build and track the detailed Joint knowledge of capabilities and availability for the JTFs.

Given the increasing importance of strategic, global "reach," the Services cannot go it alone; rather, "interdependence" is the norm. Teams and strategic alliances put one at an advantage. The bedrock of teams is cooperation and trust. Trust is vital to success. If there is a crisis of confidence, the partnership will fall apart. In addition to drill and practice there is also a need to identify a viable cooperative structure. Given the importance of strong relationships to handling crisis one cannot just *hope* that the team will come together in a crisis. Certainly, military units strive for and typically achieve cohesion but it is important to achieve this within new multi-unit modules and in Joint situations. It is important that existing within-unit and single Service cohesion not be counterproductive to the JTF environment. Internal cooperation is a prerequisite for but not a guarantee of external cooperation. With the increasing frequency of JTF operations and the short suspense period for standing them up, trust might well be enhanced if JTF HQ informed the deployment planning process. Such HQ leaders and staff would be motivated to become familiar with and track Joint capabilities and resources, which could well catapult Joint operations, interdependencies, and interoperability.

Although the Joint-Service concept is not new, present organizational structures and processes do not appear to promote actually operating jointly. There seem to be deficiencies in terms of shared goals and thinking of the "joint" groups as teams. Further, there is much redundancy in terms of support, which works against interdependence. Although Joint was mandated many years ago, with each operation much of the operation appears still to be new and informal with the Services operating independently. Without a formal and perhaps co-located management structure, there may be prohibitive start up costs each time a JTF is stood up. JTFs may be short lived but standing JTF HQs would enhance the team processes described above.

The reward structure is among the management issues to consider. Collective rewards are required for cooperation. Individual rewards promote competition. Individual responsibility can be retained with collective rewards through making tasks visible and making individuals accountable. Of course the rewards at the organizational level may need restructuring as well. Each service vies for control of financial, material and human resources and activities. Cooperation and true Joint operations may result in a restructuring and reconfiguration of the Services and perhaps relinquishing some individual Service control. Keeping the "far" common goal in mind may be difficult in the face of near rewards but it is important for the efficient and effective operation of networks. As described in the main body of the report, Joint functional support networks and funding is among the "lessons learned."

Finally, it is important to evaluate the network—in terms of process and outcomes. In addition to the information provided by "After Action Reports," it would be wise to measure the links and network structures in joint operations. Defining the "customer" for JTFs is difficult but subsequent to identifying measures of effectiveness, JTF teams should be evaluated at the mission, JTF and individual service levels. Also, it is a good idea to measure effectiveness and costs over time as the team and management structure evolve and achieve a high level of coordination and cooperation. If the military has yet to embrace Joint Operations totally, than inter-agency cooperation is a problem and multi-nation coalitions are even more problematic.

The creation of standing JTF Headquarter "teams" could be expected to enhance JTF team performance. This level and type of interaction is expected to improve communication, coordination, and cohesion and promote legitimacy and potency. The JTF HQs are expected to enhance true "Jointness" and capture the lessons from individual JTFs for subsequent more effective JTF teams.

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APPENDIX B

JTF INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

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Joint Task Force Operations
Interview Protocol

Interviewer(s): _____ Date:_____

_____ Time:-_____

Tape:_____

Point of Contact: _____ Phone:_____

Location (City/State/Country):_____

Participant:_____

Organization:_____

Characteristics:

Rank:

- ☐ O6 Colonel/Captain
- ☐ O7 Brig. Gen/R.Adm. LH
- ☐ O8 Maj. Gen/R.Adm UH
- ☐ O9 Lt. Gen/Vice Adm
- ☐ O10 Gen/Adm

Service:

- ☐ USA
- ☐ USN
- ☐ USAF
- ☐ USMC
- ☐ USCG

Notes:_____

_____

_____

_____

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INTRODUCTION

(Rank, Last Name). Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. As I previously mentioned to you, this is part of an on-going study looking at Joint Task Force Operations. In the first part of our study, we reviewed the 25 most recent JTF operations to synthesize major issues associated with the JTF process.

Our review of operations revealed that since the early 1990s, the US Military has been called to respond to an unprecedented number of crises throughout the world. While the military has managed to accomplish each of these missions, the Services have had to incur various costs along the way. As the numbers of missions have increased, both spending and manpower have continually decreased.

Today we would like to talk about your experiences in Joint Task Force Operations and further explore some of the issues we discovered through our initial study. We would like to get your perspective on the challenges and opportunities associated with the formation, activation and operation of a Joint Task Force with particular focus on the operation of the JTF HQ.

PROCESS

We are interviewing individuals with first hand knowledge and experience with JTF operations. We are interviewing members of all branches of the military to learn about their experiences. We are also interested in speaking to staff personnel affiliated with your particular operation. If you have any suggestions or recommendations we ought to consider please feel free to let us know. We would appreciate any suggestions that can inform our efforts.

At the completion of our interviews, a report will be compiled that summarizes the major points addressed in the interviews. The report will not include any information about the individuals with whom we speak—responses will remain anonymous. The report will communicate the substance of the views and concerns individuals have shared during the interviews.

With that in mind, let me thank you for agreeing to participate in today's interviews.

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GROUND RULES

Before we begin, let me share a few ground rules we will be following:

- ***We are very interested in your individual opinions and experiences.*** Keep in mind that we're interested in all of your comments, positive and negative. Feel free to share anything you deem relevant to our discussion.

- ***You may be assured of complete confidentiality.*** We will maintain your confidentiality. We will not use any names or other identifying information in the study. We may report comments verbatim but only without any names or other identifying information.

- ***We would like to tape record the session.*** Your opinions are important to us and we don't want to miss any of your comments/suggestions. Tape recording your opinions will allow us to prepare an accurate report. The tape recorded interviews will be transcribed by members of the research team. The names of participants will not be included in the transcribed reports. Only members of the research team will have access to these records. The tapes will be erased once the research is completed. Unless there are any objections, we will be tape recording today's session [PAUSE AND WAIT FOR A RESPONSE].

- ***Please speak loud and clear.*** We want to make sure we record all of your comments/suggestions. Please be sure to speak loud and clear.

- ***Our interview should take approximately no more than an hour-and-a-half***. If we need to pause at anytime during the process feel free to let us know. We will try to complete the interview as quickly as possible.

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BACKGROUND

I'd like to begin our interview by asking a couple of background questions about your experience.

1. WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF YOUR EXPERIENCE IN JOINT TASK FOR CE OPERATIONS?

Probes:

- What operation(s) were you involved with? (OP Name/JTF)
- What type of operation(s) was it (Combat, PKO, HAST, NEO)?
- What was your role in the operation? How long did you serve in role?
- What were the major challenges confronted during the operation?

2. AS YOU REFLECT BACK ON YOUR EXPERIENCES, I WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO THINK ABOUT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT JTF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE YOU HAVE HAD THUS FAR.

Probes:

- What operation/JTF was it? Why does it stand out in your mind?
    - Were there particular ***circumstances*** associated with this experience?
        - Explore: Any unique aspects including people, place, mission
    - Were there particular ***challenges*** associated with this experience?
        - Explore: Any unique challenges not seen in previous JTFs
- Can you think of some of the ***successes*** associated with this operation?
    - Were there any characteristics that contributed to its successes?
        - Explore: Any factors contributing to the OP success
- Can you think of some of the ***failures*** associated with this operation?
    - Were there any characteristics that contributed to its failures?
        - Explore: Any factors contributing to the failures

3. AS YOU REFLECT BACK ON THIS EXPERIENCE, WHAT SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD YOU OFFER TO ENHANCE THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF FUTURE JTFs?

Probes:

- Would you have any recommendations for JTF HQ (C2)?
- Would you have any recommendations for JTF C4ISR?
- Would you have any recommendations for Joint Logistics?
- Would you have any recommendations for Personnel Processing?

JTF HQ ELEMENT

I would like to discuss issues concerning the Command & Control (C2) of the JTF and more specifically the JTF HQ.

4. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE STRUCTURE OF THE JTF HQ ELEMENT?

- How was it formed? [Service centric vs. "Joint" organization]
  - Explore: Decision making process underlying formation process
    - Individuals influencing the process
    - Key considerations of the situation

Probes:

- What were some of the ***advantages*** of this structure?
  - Explore: Within-Service/Between-Service Advantages

- What were some of the ***disadvantages*** of this structure?
  - Explore: Between-Service/Within-Service Disadvantages

- Did the JTF HQ have the required people with the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities to complete the mission?
  - Explore: When were key JTF HQ billets filled?
    - How long did it take for the JMD to be approved/vetted/filled?
    - Were Services responsive to personnel requests?

5. WERE THERE ANY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERSONNEL SELECTION, PLACEMENT AND AUGMENTATION PROCESS FOR THE JTF HQ?

Probes:

- How were personnel augmented into the JTF HQ?
  - Explore: Source Fill Type—IA/Unit Fill/TDY
- Did the JTF HQ have adequate manpower levels?
  - What was the fill rate for the JTF HQ?
  - How long did it take to get adequate levels?
- Were personnel adequately trained for their positions?
  - Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of JTTPs?
    - Explore: Levels of "joint" experience/expertise
  - Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of interagency processes?
    - Explore: Depth of InterAgency experience
  - Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of Coalitional processes?
    - Explore: Depth of Coalition experience
- How can we ensure that personnel are trained to fill these roles in the future?
  - Explore: JMD Modification suggestions
  - Explore: Schooling/Training Requirements
  - Explore: Training—at what level? Who funds/organizes/evaluates?

6. WERE THERE ANY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROTATION AND REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL WITHIN THE JTF HQ?

Probes:

- Were there any challenges for filling/replacing particular positions?
  - Explore: If training was the issue vs. personnel shortage
- What about with respect to rotating/replacing personnel?
  - Explore: Timing of the process/turnover process
  - Explore: If timing resulted in losses of institutional memory
    - How were challenges resolved—were SOPs developed?
- How were new personnel integrated into the JTF HQ?
  - Explore: Describe the handover/exchange process

JRSOI

Since we are talking about personnel issues, let me ask you discuss the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Integration process for JTF personnel in general and for JTF HQ personnel in particular.

7. DESCRIBE THE JRSOI PROCESS FOR THE JTF

Probes:

- How did individuals/units flow into and out of the JTF?
    - Explore: Ask them to describe the transition process
    - Explore: Ask about stopping points—where would units be go/no-go
        - ID factors that would keep an individual/unit from moving forward

8. WHAT ISSUES CHALLENGED THE JRSOI PROCESS

Probes:

- Were there *any training concerns* that kept recurring?
    - Explore: What were the training limitations for arriving units?
    - Explore: Were training issues able to be addressed at JRSOI?
        - If Yes, how? Who organized it? Funded it? Evaluated it?
        - If No, why? What were the reasons why the issue was not resolved at the JRSOI? What were the limitations?
    - Explore: Were there units that did not move forward at all?
- Were there *any equipment concerns* that kept recurring?
    - Explore: What equipment shortfalls was commonplace?
        - C2 Related Equipment
        - J-C4ISR Equipment
    - Explore: How were equipment shortfalls addressed? Who funded it?

9. WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES

Probes:

- Are there any doctrinal changes that ought to be considered?
- Are there any changes that may impact the JMD process? Do we need to do something different with the JMD process?

COMMUNICATIONS

Next, I would like to explore communications within the JTF. I am particularly interested in learning about how the communications process was organized within the JTF HQ. I would also like to get a sense of the communications configuration—equipment used.

10. CAN YOU PROVIDE A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE JTF?

Probes:

- What type of systems was used for C4ISR?
    - Explore: Type of hardware used by JTF
    - Explore: Type of software used by JTF
    - Explore: Type of Netware used by JTF

11. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS FOR THE JTF?

Probes:

- Did communication processes function to meet the needs of the JTF HQ?
    - Explore: If YES
        - What factors facilitate success?
        - Were communications capabilities already available for use?
    - Explore: If NO
        - What factors contributed to the failure?
        - How were these factors resolved?
        - How did these issues impact JTF?

- Did communication process function to meet the needs of *supporting units/organizations*?
    - Explore: If YES
        - What factors facilitate success?
        - Were communications capabilities already available for use?
    - Explore: If NO
        - What factors contributed to the failure?
            - Hardware/Software/Netware issues
        - How were these factors resolved?
        - How did these issues impact JTF?

- Did communications process function to meet the needs of the *Interagency organizations*?
    - Explore: Communication challenges with the Interagency
        - Hardware/Software/Netware Issues
        - Access/Classification/Sanitation Issues
        - Impact on JTF operations?
        - How were these issues resolved?
        - Any policy/doctrinal recommendations?

- Did communications process function to meet the needs of the *Coalition partners*?
    - Explore: Communication challenges with Coalition partners
        - Hardware/Software/Netware Issues
        - Access/Classification/Sanitation Issues
        - Impact on JTF operations?
        - How were these issues resolved?
        - Any policy/doctrinal recommendations?

12. WHAT SUGGESTIONS WOULD YOU OFFER TO IMPROVE THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS FOR FUTURE JTF OPERATIONS?

Probes:

- Any policy guidance with regard to OTE?
    - Explore: Standard requirements for JTF COM packages
        - JTF HQ, Supporting Organizations/Units Requirements
        - Interagency/Coalition Requirements

JOINT LOGISTICS

Next, I would like to explore the logistics aspects of the JTF process.

13. DESCRIBE THE LOGISTICS PROCESS FOR THE JTF

Probes:

- What was the underlying logistics model?
  - Service Centric vs. Joint
- How were the logistics requirements filled?
- Who was responsible for identifying/tracking/filling requirements?
  - Single Service/Lead Service/Joint

14. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LOGISTIC PROCESS

Probes:

- Did the process work well?
- What were some of the underlying challenges?
- What changes were required to make the process work?
- What impact did these changes have on JTF operations?
  - Explore: Impact on JTF HQ operations
  - Explore: Impact on Supporting Organizations

15. ARE THERE ANY CHANGES YOU WOULD RECOMMEND FOR DOCTRINE OR TRAINING?

Probes:

- Which of the changes would suggest institutionalizing into doctrine/training?
- What potential gains may these changes have on future JTF operations?
  - Explore: Impact on JTF HQ operations
  - Explore: Impact on Supporting Organizations

INTERAGENCY & COALITION INTEGRATION

Now let me ask you to discuss JTF interaction with the Interagency and Coalition partners.

16. DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE INTERACTIONS WITH THE INTERAGENCY AND COALITION PARTNERS

Probes:

- What was the role of the interagency/coalition in the JTF or JTF HQ?
  - Explore: Any IA/COAL personnel in the JTF-HQ?
- Were there any existing relationships that helped to establish JTF-IA/COA interactions?

17. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH WORKING WITH THE INTERAGENCY AND COALITION PARTNERS

Probes:

- Were there any unique issues to consider?
  - Explore: C4ISR issues
  - Explore: Intel sharing issues
- How were these issues resolved?
  - Explore: JTF SOPs developed for working with IA/COA
- How would you assess the workarounds developed during the process?
  - Explore: Can these be translated into doctrine?

18. WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD YOU SUGGEST FOR WORKING WITH IA/COAL PARTNERS IN FUTURE JTFs

Probes:

- Are there any policies that need to be developed for working with IA/COA
  - Explore: C4ISR issues
  - Explore: Intel sharing issues

END

Let me summarize some of the major points that I heard during our discussion. [SUMMARIZE THE MAJOR POINTS OF THE DISCUSSION]. Are there any other points that I missed? Are there any additional points?

This concludes our interview. Once again let me thank you for taking the time to share your opinions and experiences. Your opinions are invaluable for our efforts to learn about the myriad of factors that affect the JTF process. Thank you.


NPS
PRAESTANTIA PER SCIENTIAM